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INTRODUCTION
In the last few years considerable progress has been made in the development of an analytic theory of
military Command Control (C2), both as a process and as a large-scale system. There are now models of C2
organizations which permit the examination %f the effects of various changes in a C2 system and which can
predict some of the behavior of such a system in a gross sense. And, due to the increased attention being
given the field, with the attendant increase in papers, workshops, etcetera, there is slowly developing a
common vocabulary for use in the emerging/C2 Theory. -- ..Q
What is still lacking, however, is a body of experimental data which can be used as a 'touchstone to
guide further theoretical developments, and against which theoretical predictions can be tested.
This paper reports the results of a very rudimentary experiment which was conducted at the Naval Post-
graduate School at Monterey, California, during the 1983 Winter Quarter to test two specific hypotheses. As is
often the case, it was found necessary to modify or restate the hypotheses during the conduct of the experiment
in order to accommodate certaine')real world "constraints. The results, however, are both interesting in their
own right and reassuring for the prospect of being able to do further experiments in the C2 arena.
Motivation for the Experiments connected to the decision-making process and which
can be observed in numerous settings, but which are
The practical motivation for this experiment lay in a independent of the details of the scenario and the
desire to study the "decision making" process in a C2 particular participants.
process. "Decisions" are one of the two major
products of a C2 system. (The other major C2 system Pursuing this line of reasoning, it was decided that
product may be considered to be "plans" which are an interesting characteristic quantity might be the
statements of actions to be taken by various parts of time interval between decisions, independent of what
the system. They are generated either to implement a the decisions were. A histogram of this interval
previous decision or to provide for possible future against the number of cases in which it was observed
decisions. In many cases they have the nature of should give one some idea about the tempo of activity
"pre-determined decisions.") It was this motivation in a command center.
which led to the approach and the experimental
procedure adopted. But this leads to the question of defining "a
decision" and how it is to be observed. At first it
In keeping with a "hard science" approach to the was felt that decisions could be grouped into broad
development of a C2 Theory, we wanted to find classes, such as tactical, strategic, or logistics,
"observables" which could be observed by people who and observed or logged by listening to the conversa-
were not part of the system and which could also be tions between members of the battle staff. In
observed by other investigators, in other experiments, practice, this turned out to be virtually impossible,
and a simpler but more exact definition of a decision
It should be noted that, by the nature of the C2 was adopted.
business, which involves both people and complex
scenarios, it is nearly impossible to "replicate" an Specifically, decisions were defined as space-time
experiment. People, unfortunately, learn, and their events made manifest by either utterances or a series
behavior on a second trial will be different from of keystrokes on a computer terminal which request or
what it was on the first. Also, different "command transmit information or directions. This definition
teams" or battle staffs will have different satisfies the requirement that the decision be
approaches or "styles" in dealing with the same basic observable, i.e., it is given physical reality. (My
problem. Furthermore, in "free play" exercises, decision to have steak for dinner tomorrow has no
hhich are the only ones ia which real decision making reality until I make it known to the outside world by
takes place, the dynamics o the entities in the telling someone else.) This choice also takes us
scenario very seldom repeat. In particular, succes- down to the "operating level" in the decision-making
sive plays of the same scenario generally do not lead process. A decision to ask for information, or to
to the same physical configuration of the battlefield send a message, is now treated equally with a
after even a few minutes of play. Therefore, decision to engage the enemy. (Perhaps a better name
"replication," in the sense it is used in physics or for "decisions" defined in this way would be "trans-
chemistry, is a practical impossibility. Rather, we actions," but for now we shall continue to call them
must search for observables which are in some way decisions.) This definition of decision led directly
to a revised version of the original first hypothesis:
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A Commander or Battle Staff produces decisions The display systems in the Blue and Orange command
which are evidenced by utterances or keystrokes posts showed only those targets which had been
and which can be observed by external detected by their own sensor systems, while the
observers. Furthermore, different external umpire's position had access to the data as seen by
observers will agree on the "class" to which the each side as well as to ground truth.
observed decision belongs if the classes are
chosen in a reasonably general manner. The class running the war game was split into three
. groups (A, B, and C) of two (Orange and Blue) three-
The notion of a "class" of decisions will be man teams. Each was a familiarization session in
described further below, when we discuss the which they learned how to operate the keyboard and
experimental procedure. But before going on to that, make the machine do some elementary things. In the
it will be recalled that there was a second second session they actually did play a war game,
hypothesis to be tested in this experiment. The deploy their forces, and get to the point of engaging
original form of this hypothesis was stated as the enemy. The final session was run "for the
follows: record" and was based on a scenario and initial force
disposition very siiiar to the ones with which they
The histogram of time intervals between had practiced. By this time the Battle Staffs seemed
decisions should give an indication of the state to be reasonably comfortable with the system and
of training or competency of the Commander or could concentrate most of their effort on the battle
Battle Staff. rather than the game mechanics.
It seemed reasonable to assume that a relatively To carry out the experiment and test these hypo-
untrained team would take almost random amounts of theses, observers were recruited from other students
time to arrive at each of a series of decisions, enrolled in the Command Control and Communications
leading to a nearly flat histogram. At the same curriculum at the Postgraduate School, and arrange-
time, a more experienced group would have better ments made to have them present during the running of
defined work habits and evidence a more peaked the games.
distribution. In fact, one might expect a bimodal
distribution, with simple or routine decisions being Only limited observations were made during the first
made quickly and effortlessly, while more complex series of runs, to test the methodology. The data
procedures took longer. Alternatively, a complex reported here were all taken during the second and
problem might result in a long time delay, followed third series of runs, when the performance of the
by a flurry of activity with short apparent Battle Teams had become reasonably stable.
inter-transaction times.
Experimental Procedure
Unfortunately the data collected in this experiment
do not allow for a simple determination of which For the experiment, each observer was equipped with a
decisions may have resulted from some previous one. clipboard of data sheets which had a synchronized
Nor is there any direct way to associate one decision clock mounted on it. They were instructed to record
with another in an input-output sense. Investigation to the nearest second when they thought they observed
of these matters will have to await an improved a "decision" and the "class" of that decision. A
experimental procedure. sample of the data sheet is reproduced in Figure 1,
which also shows the classes of decisions used in
The Experimental Setting this experiment. These classes were intended to be
generic in nature and encompass nearly all the situa-
An opportunity to test these hypotheses arose during tions which were expected to be observed.
the 1983 Winter Quarter at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California. The observer was also asked, if he had time, to enter
any amplifying information in the "Notes" column.
A series of computer-based war games were to be run, The columns for "Game Time" and "Enter Time" were
using the Warfare Environment Simulator (WES) at the provided to allow correlation to game time (which can
Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), San Diego, be faster or slower than clock time) and to note the
California, to which the Postgraduate School has a time when an instruction which had been observed
remote access capability. The purpose of these games passing from one team member to another, was actually
was to give the students in the Operations Research entered on the keyboard. The latter turned out to be
curriculum an opportunity to get "hands-on" an impossible task as the keyboards were in such
experience with the operation of a war game. Thus, constant use as to preclude connecting any particular
the subject "Battle Staffs" were certainly set of keystrokes with any specific utterance. (In
inexperienced and, in fact, being made up of members future experiments it may be possible to achieve some
of all four services, many of the players were of these measurements by installing appropriate
unfamiliar with Navy terminology and procedures. "hooks" in the game software.)
The WES facility at the Postgraduate School at that After the experimental session, the observations were
time consisted of three sets of displays, one each transcribed into a computer program which computed
for the Orange and Blue teams and one for the umpire the desired time Intervals and could generate various
or game coordinator. Each set of displays had a histograms of the results. Figure 2 is a sample of a
large graphic display of the theater of operations in data file generated by this program.
the center with a smaller alphanumeric display and
keyboard on each side of it. The scale of the As shown in the Figure, it was eventually decided to
geographic display could be changed to provide a classify the decisions by "type" as well as "class."
'zoom" capability and appropriate symbology depicted This was partly due to the confusion between dif-
the location of objects. One of the alphanumeric ferent observers as to which class a particular
displays was generally used only as a status board, decision should be placed in, and partly because of
while the other was used to give instructions to the the limited number of observations of members of a
machine to effect control of that side's forces. particular class. By introducing a definition of
"types" of decisions as either "information
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decisions" or "action decisions," the sample size was recording a similar series of events. A detailed
effectively increased and the differences between comparison of their event logs bears this out. In
observers was reduced to a negligible amount. fact, in all cases where there were two or more
Examples of this distinction are decisions which deal observers watching the same battle staff, there was
with "information," such as requesting status or remarkable agreement in what they logged as
identity, and those decisions which deal with "decisions" or transactions.
"action," such as deploying a force or changing the
EMCON condition. The two major sources of nonconformity of the logs
were the differences of interpretation mentioned
With these additions to the data definitions, the above and a very simple but important physical limi-
time intervals are defined as follows: tation. Because the battle staff were sitting
side-by-side in front of the displays, the observers
TO = real world clock time tended to sit on either side of them so they could
TI = time since last decision, independent of both see the displays and hear what the group was
its class talking about. This led to one observer being able
T2 = change in TI since last TI event to hear remarks about what was on the status board
T3 = tire since last decision oil same " ype" better than the other, while the second was more
T4 = change in T3 since last T3 event alert to directions to the keyboard operator.
TS = time since last decision of same "class"
T6 = change in TS since last T5 event Nonetheless, as a gener~l rule the overlap of the
logs of pairs of observers was about 60 percent, even
By generating such data files on disk, each repre- without any serious attempt to agree on just how the
senting the observations of one observer (using the classification scheme would be applied. At the
observer's name as file name) during a game he grosser level of whether it was an "action" trans-
observed (using the team r.me and game number as a action or one dealing with information, the agreement
file extension), the data was set up to allow com- was nearly 80 percent. The "disagreements" are
parison of different observers as well as different nearly all accounted for by a missing entry on one of
teams and games. the logs. That is, one observer logged an event
which the other did not. In most :ases this can be
The results of this analysis are reported in the next explained as a result of the placement of the
section. observer relative to the battle staff, as mentioned
above.Experimental Results
Moreover, data taken by the same observer watching
Before examining the specific experimental results, a different Battle Staffs produces plots very similar
word about the choice of "classes of transactions" is to those shown in Figures 3 and 4. So the distribu-
in order because they turned out to influence the tion of time intervals butween decisions does seem to
apparent results. In particular, the distinction be a characteristic quantity, at least in this
between ordering the deployment of one or two units setting.
or platforms and ordering the deployment (e.g., a
course change) of the whole force was interpreted An interesting change is observed, however, when the
differently by different observers. And the same was time j.tween successive action or information trans-
true of requests for the status of individual units actior. is plotted, as in Figures 5 and 6. The
or of a major portion if the force. Much of this action decisions still show the Rayleigh-like distri-
confusion could have been overcome if there had been bution, while the information decisions are more
more time to test the methodology and have the data uniformly distributed. No explanation for this is
takers agree on some conventions. As it was, there offered, but an interesting comparison with some
was a minimum amount of coordination between the other data will be made below. (Also it was noted
observers, and each one made up his own rules as to that some observers seemed to be more sensitive to
how he would classify the events he observed, action decisions than to information decisions, per-
haps reflecting their personality more than their
The basic classes were originally chosen because it location in the command space.)
was assumed that they were sufficiently general to
encompass all the transactions which were likely to Based on these results, it seems that the first of
take place, while also being representative of the hypotheses to be tested is confirmed by the data
distinctly different sorts of activity which one which was taken during this experiment.
would expect to see in a command center.
As far as the second hypothesis is concerned, we can
In practice, it appears that these were reasonable only report that there is no signif.cant differcnce
assumptions, but that the definition of the "classes between the data obtained in the second and third
of transactions" can probably be improved, and in sets of war games. If there was any "learning
fact should probably be tailored to match the nature effect," it was masked by other attributes of the
of the scenario and/or level of command which is game.
being examined. Figures 3 and 4 present a typical
comparison of the time between transactions, inde- A final interesting observation is that in essential-
pendent of the type or class of transaction, as ly all cases the observers logged about two-thirds of
recorded by two different observers watching the same the transactions as action decisions and only
battle staff. These Figures are histograms of the one-third as information decisions. This may be
time Intervals between observed decisions, grouped partly due to the nature of the WES facility, in
into 18-second wide bins. (The units of "width" are which the Battle Staffs have to issue a rather large
seconds.) For ease of comparison, the actual number number of maneuvering instructions to their
of observations has been normalized to 100 so these (computer-simulated) forces. This his the effect of
represent percentage distributions, putting the Battle Staff in a much more "tactical"
role than a "command" role. Also, with only one
It is immediately obvious that the observers were command center on each side, there were no superiors
apparently observing the same sort of behavior and or subordinates to answer questions for or receive
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queries from. A third cause may have been the facility nstalled to support its war gaming
presence of electronic status boards which provided functions since these data wore taken.
information without the verbal clues which permitted
the transaction to be recorded. Conclusions
Comparison With a Manual War Game First, it seems evident that one can define space-
time events (which we shall call decisions or
Coincident with the conduct of this experiment, the transactions) which deal with either actions or
"historical logs" of a game run at the war-gaming information and which are maoe observable through
facility at the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode utterances or keystrokes made by the Battle Staff, on
Island, during the preceding fall became available, which different observers will agree. That is, dif-
ferent observers will report observing the same type
This game also involved some inexperienced players of event at the same time. And it seems likely that
but these were supported by trained and experienced these space-time events could be further subdivided
Naval officers, and both sides had had considerable with more careful training and discussion among the
time to develop their plans before the game com- observers.
menced. In addition to the game being basically a
manual one without automated status boards, etc., Second, the gross inter-transaction time has a
there were several levels of command represented on distribution not unlike a Rayleigh distribution, and
each side. Thus it was quite a different environment which seems to be a common behavior even in quite
and perhaps more closely simulated the conditions different situtations.
which one might expect in a typical command node in a
Navy C2 system. Third, the inter-transaction time between trans-
actions of the same type may differ between different
In order to obtain some comparative data, the logged types.
events were divided into the classes shown in Figure
7. These classes were chosen as being more repre- Fourth, the time between transactions seems to be a
sentative of the log entries, although they still minimum at the level of the highest "on-scene"
, retain the distinction between action and information Commander. This is interpreted as meaning that his
decisions. (Although these classes are also divided "operating tempo" is forcei to be high enough to
into "input" and "output" groups, no analysis of this encompass the total activity below him, which is
dimension has yet been undertaken.) divided among several subordinates.
Using these data, which are based on the editing and And finally, the qualitative differences between the
compilation of many observers' logs into one by the Newport data and that taken on WES may indicate that
game historian, similar analyses were carried out. introducing computer assistance into a command center
Two typical plots are shown in Figures 8 and 9, which will change the nature of the "transactions" which
depict one six-hour period in the game at two levels one sees taking place. If true, this may have seri-
of command, CTF 70.1, the Battle Force Commander, and ous implications for the design and organization of
70.X, one or his four immediate subordinates. It future command control systems.
should be noted that the basic time unit of "width"
used in these Figures is one minute rather than the
second used for the WES data.
While the most striking thing about these data is the
similarity of the plots to those obtained with the
data taken during the WES war games, there are
several other interesting points.
First, the activity seems to be peaked at the level
of the Battle Force commander. While not displayed,
the plots of activity at the level of SEVENTH Fleet
Commander show only about one-sixth the number of
decisions per unit time that are evident at the Force
Commander level. And the Force Commander's subordi-
nate is operating at about half his tempo. However,
there are four subordinates, so the total activity is
higher at the lower level, as one would expect it toSbe.
Second, the effective mean time between decisions
J seems to be about two minutes, rather than the 15 to
20 seconds seen in the WES game. This, of course,
may be an artifact of the coarser time increments
used in the Newport logs, as well as the less
tactical nature of the decisions being made.
And thirdly, the statistics on types of transactions
were exactly reversed from that seen at WES.
Two-thirds of the decisions involved information and
- *only one-third or less involved action. Whether this
was due to the lack of computer aids or to a more
realistic simulation of a command situation Is not
clear. It is hoped that additional light can be shed
on this subject by obtaining some more data at the
ar College, which has had a major computer
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Group: Side: Date: Observer: Page:
Decision Classes:
ES = request EMCON status CE = order a change in EMCON
FS = request Force status DF - deploy the Force
US = request status of a unit DU = deploy a unit
RI = request for an identity EE = engage enemy (or target)
SD = seek othep data AO = all other decisions




Data Form Used for WES Experiments.
COMMAND CENTER INTER-ACTIVITY TIMES
No. DTG TO Ti T2 TYP T3 T4 Act T5 T6
------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------
0 151800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
I 151833 33 33 33 2 0 0 AO 0 0
2 152317 317 284 251 1 0 0 FS 0 0
3 152406 366 49 -235 2 333 333 AO 333 333
4 152432 392 26 -23 1 75 75 FS 75 75
5 152508 428 36 10 1 36 -39 FS 36 -39
6 152530 450 22 -14 2 84 -249 DU 0
7 152612 492 42 20 1 64 28 SD 0 0
8 152735 575 83 41 1 83 19 US 0 0
9 152807 607 32 -51 1 32 -51 SD 115 115
10 152854 654 47 15 1 47 15 US 79 79
11 152937 697 43 -4 2 247 163 AO 331 -2
12 153015 735 38 -5 2 38 -209 AO 38 -293
13 153058 778 43 5 2 43 5 DF 0 0
14 153146 826 48 5 2 48 5 DF 48 48
15 153256 896 70 22 2 70 22 AO 161 123
16 153323 923 27 -43 1 269 0 FS 495 0
Figure 2.
Print-Out of Computed Time Intervals as Stored in Computer Data Files.





r *129 Observations 116 Samples 12 Bins Width 18
Fiie u WREN/B2 Act.type = I Time int.= T 1
Gan2 interval from: 153000 to: 170500 NORMALIZED
9 ' j Figure 3.
Distribution of Time Intervals Seen by Observer Wren.
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105 Observations 96 Samples 12 Bins Width 18
File = LOMBARDO/B2 Act.type = 1 Time int.= T 1
Game interval from: 153000 to: 170500 NORMALIZED
Figure 4.
Distribution of Time Intervals Seen by Observer Lombardo.






129 Observations 85 Samples 12 Bins Width 18
File = WREN/B2 Act.type = 3 Time int.= T 3
Game interval from: 153000 to: 170500
Figure 5.
Time Intervals Between "Action" Decisions (Un-normalized).






129 Observations 31 Samples 12 Bins Width Is
File = WREN/B2 Act.type = 2 Time lnt.u T 3
Game interval from: 153000 to: 170500
Figure 6.
Time Intervals Between "Information" Decisions (Un-normalized).
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Input transactions Output transactions
Info: RR - receive a report SR = send a report
RQ - receive a query SQ = send a query
Action: RD - receive a directive SD = send a directive
HT - receive tasking ST = send tasking
------------------------------------------------- ~-----------------------------
- Miscel AO = all other decisions JE = journal entry
Figure 7.
Decision Taxonomy Used for Newport data.
The distinction between directives and tasking is that directives leave the
method of implementation to the subordinate, while a tasking includes specific
detailed instructions. The JE category was used for remarks by the historian.







174 Observations 174 Samples 12 Bins Width = 1
File = CTF701/P1 Act.type = 1 Time int.= T 1
Figure 8.
Distribution of Time Intervals Observed in
Command Center of Battle Force Commander.





89 Observations 89 Samples 12 Bins Width I
File = CTF703/P1 Act.type I Time int.= T I
Figure 9.
Distribution of Time Intervals Observed in the
Command Center of a Subordinate Battle Group Commander.
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